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ABSTRACT
This article examines transitional justice in Kenya, drawing on
interviews and focus groups with survivors of the post-election
violence of 2007–2008. Focusing particularly on the experiences
of women and internally displaced persons (IDPs), it explores how
survivors understood and negotiated waiting for reparations and
analyses the effects of temporal uncertainty (around timing and
scope) and of inequality (in relation to waiting times). Uncertainty
and inequality contributed to survivors’ senses of passivity and
exacerbated their feelings of marginalisation. To delay reparations
for an uncertain time contributes to senses of continuity with the
past, which transitional justice precisely seeks to disrupt.
However, the study also demonstrates that waiting is not only
endured, but at times actively resisted or rejected, which might
be understood as a claim to ownership of local peace and
exercise of peacebuilding agency but also as resistance against
the dominant temporality of transitional justice. By framing
survivors’ experiences with the scholarship on time and power
and the “politics of waiting”, the research contributes to the
literature on local experiences and understandings of transitional
justice and to recent debates around its temporalities.
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This article examines transitional justice in Kenya, drawing on interviews and focus
groups with survivors of the post-election violence of 2007–2008. Focusing particularly
on the experiences of women and internally displaced persons (IDPs), it explores how
survivors complied with, negotiated and resisted waiting for reparations. Transitional
justice describes the various judicial and non-judicial measures that are undertaken by
societies to confront legacies of violence, abuse and repression. While initially – in the
1980s and 1990s – being thought of as ‘a vehicle for helping to deliver liberal goods in
postconflict and postauthoritarian societies’, transitional justice has increasingly been
applied to contexts that do not involve a liberal political transition and has become
associated with peacebuilding after mass violence.1 The Kenyan case illustrates this
shift well: the establishment of its transitional justice mechanisms – a truth commission
(the Truth Reconciliation and Justice Commission, or TJRC), and international criminal
prosecutions under the mandate of the International Criminal Court (ICC) – followed
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Natascha Mueller-Hirth n.mueller-hirth@rgu.ac.uk School of Applied Social Studies, Robert Gordon
University, Aberdeen AB10 7QG, Scotland
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2021.1950749
the post-election violence of 2007–2008 and a long post-independence history of author-
itarianism, political repression and widespread gross violations of human rights.2
Common transitional justice tools include criminal prosecutions, truth seeking mech-
anisms, reparations, constitutional and institutional reforms, amnesty, lustration and
memorialisation.3 Of these mechanisms, reparations are considered to be most directly
and immediately centred on victims and their needs.4 Recent debates – for example
around the potential and challenges of linking reparations to development, to socio-
economic transformation, and to gender transformation5 – reflect wider critiques
about the marginalisation of socio-economic and structural concerns in favour of civil
and political rights violations in transitional justice. The ideal of reparations, whether
material or symbolic, to restore the status quo ex ante of the victim might be considered
a fantasy,6 but, as feminist scholars have demonstrated, it is also perverse for women and
members of other disadvantaged groups, implying the return of the victim to a state of
unjust disadvantage.7 In practice, reparations involve processes of social and political
contestation and negotiation, which shape, and are shaped by, potentially competing
definitions and hierarchies of victimhood and the agency of different social actors.8
Reparations programmes in a diverse range of post-conflict settings have been divisive,
creating tensions and competition between different groups of victims.9
Despite an emphasis on ‘adequate, effective and prompt reparations’ in the UN’s legal
framework, the Right to a Remedy and Reparation,10 reparations are often delayed and
waiting for justice characterises the everyday lives of many victims of human rights vio-
lations. Of the 84 transitions that took place between 1970 and 2004, reparations were
implemented in only fourteen cases, and, even then, victims wait an average of five
and a half years after a transition to democracy to receive reparations.11 In Kenya, this
is apparent in the fact that the TJRC published its final report in 2013 – recommending
lustrations, prosecutions and a reparations policy, the latter including individual repara-
tions (such as pensions, medical and psychosocial support) and collective reparations
(such as land restitution, socio-economic measures and commemorations) – but its rec-
ommendations have not been implemented to date.
In order to analyse how such long-term waiting impacts survivors and how it shapes
their understandings of justice and peace, the paper draws on the sociology of time,
which highlights that delays are not neutral or co-incidental: as Pierre Bourdieu put it,
waiting is one of the key sites in which the link between time and power can be experi-
enced.12 Recently, there has been growing attention to the temporalities of transitional
justice and to how time shapes transitional processes. Time is central to the very aims
of transitional justice: transitional justice mechanisms act as temporal framings that
seek to control what is and is not brought from the past, so that nations can build
new peaceful futures.13 Historian Berber Bevernage argues that truth commissions, as
a key transitional justice mechanism, serve to produce and manipulate temporal distance
by ‘enforc[ing] the characteristically modernist belief in a break between past and
present.’14 By establishing a sense of historical discontinuity, transitional justice aims
to construct a present freed from the haunting past and its violence and injustice.15
Recent scholarship in peace and conflict studies has charted how the dominant transi-
tional justice temporality, while constructing the (violent) pasts and (peaceful) present
as clearly delimited,16 does not represent the lived experiences of people recovering
from trauma, violence and suffering.17 Past and present can seem continuous because
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violence has not ceased or because experiences of marginalisation continue in the “post”-
conflict era;18 historical injustices, such as colonial structural violence, and their impor-
tance to contemporary conflict, are part of a ‘larger temporality that exceeds mainstream
conceptualizations and legal-technocratic approaches that inform [transitional justice]
scenarios.’19 While experiences of waiting are the focus of this paper, temporal domina-
tion in transitional justice is far broader than enforced waiting.20 For instance, it can be
enacted through the social and political pressures exerted on survivors to conform to the
temporality of transitional justice,21 or through the power of certain actors to set or limit
timeframes for transitional justice institutions.22
This study specifically examines the ways in which women survivors that qualified for
reparations understood and negotiated their waiting. Women’s experiences of violent
conflict as well as their transitional justice needs after conflict differ from those of
men.23 What is more, feminist scholarship has long documented the continuities
between times of conflict and supposed “peace” times for women.24 This makes it impor-
tant to investigate women’s experiences of waiting for reparations. An additional focus is
on the experiences of IDPs, which is appropriate given the linkages of displacement with
waiting in previous scholarship and the fact that IDPs are one of the only groups of
victims who received some government assistance.25 This paper then contributes to
two areas: the scholarship on local experiences of transitional justice and the emerging
critical debates around its temporalities. The article now proceeds as follows. Part two
discusses the literature on time and power as it relates to transitional justice, particularly
emphasising the relevance of a politics of waiting through which states and other actors
exert temporal domination. After an overview of the methodology, section four provides
some contextual background on violence and the shift from transitional justice to a
limited form of restorative justice in Kenya. I begin discussing the empirical data in
section five. Despite the relatively long passage of time since the post-election violence
(PEV), the majority of participants characterised themselves as still waiting for the
implementation of the reparations programme and for compensation. I highlight the
effects of, first, temporal uncertainty and, second, inequality. Nonetheless, some intervie-
wees actively chose to refuse waiting for reparations, sometimes in favour of exercising
peacebuilding agency at the local level, as section six demonstrates. To give up waiting
can be understood as resistance against the passivity and subordination of waiting and
as a rejection of transitional justice time itself. In concluding, I set out the significance
of an analysis of the politics of waiting in relation to transitional justice.
Experiences of transitional justice and the politics of waiting
Transitional justice scholarship has increasingly attended to the ways in which transi-
tional justice policies and mechanisms are experienced and interpreted by those
affected by past violence. Whether conceived of as victim-centred transitional justice,
local experiences of transitional justice or transitional justice from below, this literature,
while diverse and context-specific, establishes that people’s experiences of and priorities
for transitional justice are frequently very different to the intentions or predictions of
transitional justice interventions.26 By focusing on one aspect of transitional justice,
reparations, I do not intend to conflate the two or suggest that reparations necessarily
constitute justice for survivors. However, as Robins’ large mixed method study of the
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reparative and justice needs of victims of human rights violations throughout the post-
colonial era in Kenya shows, most prioritised compensation or economic support. While
there were some differences in the preferences of victims of various types of violations
(such as displacement, sexual violence, state violence or ethnic violence), only a small
minority who were financially secure, largely educated and urban, prioritised issues of
truth and justice over compensation.27 Similar findings emerge from studies of
victims’ needs in other transitional settings, with socio-economic concerns and distribu-
tive justice particularly prioritised in contexts of ongoing insecurity and extreme
poverty.28 The focus, in this paper, on experiences of reparations is moreover justified
by the TJRC’s own prioritising of reparative justice.29
Waiting is an everyday experience – one that is often described as a condition of mod-
ernity and bureaucracy. Yet, as the literature on time and power reveals, it is not neutral.
For example, Schwartz claimed that ‘the distribution of waiting time coincides with the
distribution of power’, with those who are kept waiting considered to have less social
worth.30 Despite its universal nature, waiting appears to be a ‘recurring, almost modal,
experience among the destitute’.31 Recent work demonstrates that subaltern populations,
be they welfare recipients,32 asylum seekers and refugees,33 the displaced,34 or the unem-
ployed,35 are often facing long-term or chronic waiting – ‘situations in which people have
been compelled to wait for years, generations or whole lifetimes, not as the result of their
voluntary movement through modern spaces but because they are perpetually unable to
realize their goal.’36
As part of the growing attention to (a) how transitional justice mechanisms are experi-
enced by people themselves and (b) the temporalities in transitional justice, it is impor-
tant to analyse the effects of long-term waiting for transitional justice on survivors. In
order to do so, this article frames survivors’ experiences of reparations with the scholar-
ship on the politics of waiting, defined as ‘temporal processes in and through which pol-
itical subordination is reproduced.’37 In his ethnographic study of social welfare
recipients in Buenos Aires, Auyero finds that waiting produces compliant subjectivities,
manufacturing ‘subjects who know, and act accordingly, that when dealing with state
bureaucracy they have to patiently comply with the seemingly arbitrary, ambiguous,
and always changing state requirements.’38 Waiting exacerbates poor people’s margina-
lisation, because it affects those without resources disproportionately more severely.39 As
discussed earlier, women in “post”-conflict settings constitute a group that is margina-
lised in particular ways. Uncertainty about the duration of the wait in particular is a
key factor that can operate as a form of social control.40 Research from South Africa high-
lights that delays in the implementation of victim support policies have fixed some sur-
vivors of Apartheid-era human rights violations in a “permanent liminality” that
impacted their ability to transition out of their victimhood.41 Waiting was partly
endured by these survivors because they could not afford not to wait, and partly
because of their loyalty to the African National Congress (ANC).
These arguments might suggest that waiting is a passive and oppressive act. But there
is evidence that it can in fact be active, productive or strategic. Discussing the experiences
of residents waiting for eviction in Ho Chi Minh City, Harms shows that the temporality
of eviction has diverse effects. Some were oppressed by waiting, whereas other, typically
male, residents, transformed the long wait into an economically productive and some-
times empowering experience, such as when their livelihoods, built on networking and
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connecting people, ‘operate outside the linear, goal-oriented spacetime of neoliberal
capitalism.’42 For young unemployed men in India, shared waiting enabled new political
and cultural opportunities across different castes.43 Brun’s study of internally displaced
people in Georgia contends that people living with protracted uncertainty can nonethe-
less move on through ‘agency-in-waiting’: their ‘capacity to act in the present, in everyday
time, based on the experience of displacement […] and a critical reflection of the future
possibilities framed as waiting and hope.’44
Methodology
This study draws on semi-structured interviews and focus groups with predominantly
female survivors of the PEV of 2007–2008, undertaken in January and February 2017.
It was informed by an interpretivist methodology, enabling a focus on the experiences,
interpretations and understandings of people directly affected by violent conflict. The
academic research from which this article draws sought to understand the reparative
and development needs of female survivors of the PEV in order to examine the intersec-
tions and tensions between transitional justice and transformative justice.45
Three focus groups were undertaken – one in Nakuru County (10 participants, all
female), and two in Kisumu County (12 and 8 participants respectively, both including
male and female participants), lasting between two hours and two hours and a half. One
of these focus groups comprised only individuals who identified as IDPs. Twenty-seven
semi-structured interviews were carried out (23 female and four male interviewees) and
lasted between 30 minutes and one hour. In Bungoma, Uasin Gishu andWest Pokot Coun-
ties, interviews were conducted while accompanying field visits of the Eldoret-based NGO
Rural Women Peace Link whose activities centre on conflict mitigation and gender
justice. This also enabled me to sit in on meetings, trainings and workshops and observe
the organisation’s work with stakeholders such as community organisers and village
elders. I participated in two advocacy workshops to localise the Kenya National Action
Plan (KNAP) in West Pokot County and attended a meeting of civil society organisations
working on conflict prevention in Bungoma County with a UK development funder.
Participants were recruited through community-based organisations and personal
contacts in Nairobi, Eldoret and Kisumu. They were between 23 and 67 years old.
Their names have been anonymised. Field sites included communities in Bungoma,
Kisumu, Nakuru, Nairobi, Uasin Gishu and West Pokot Counties that were selected
because they were among the most severely affected during the PEV. Kenya’s diversity
in terms of cultures, languages and ethnicities mean that there are considerable variations
between survivors’ experiences of violence and of transitional justice. Topics in focus
groups and interviews covered participants’ experiences of policies and programmes
for justice and development; their peace, justice and development demands; and their
understandings of transition and transformation. This article only focuses on one set
of findings around the experiences and negotiations of waiting for reparations for the
violations participants experienced during the 2007–2008 PEV.46 This is because partici-
pants most frequently talked about reparations when asked about their transitional
justice.
While participants were almost all female, thus not allowing a comparison of experi-
ences across genders, previous scholarship shows that women’s transitional justice needs
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after conflict differ from those of men, partly as a result of traditional gender roles that
men and women continue to perform.47 In his study of Kenyan victims, Robins identified
demands for livelihoods and compensation as particularly important for women who
suddenly became heads of households as a result of conflict, as was the case for a
number of women in this study.48
From transitional justice to restorative justice
The violence that erupted in Kenya between December 2007 and the end of February
2008 followed a disputed presidential election. It involved police use of excessive force
against protestors as well as violence by supporters of the ruling and opposition
parties, triggered by weak institutions, ethnically-driven clientist political parties and a
decline in the state’s monopoly of legitimate force.49 Some 1,100 people were killed,
660,000 displaced and 40,000 became victims of gender-based violence. The PEV
reflected decades of political manipulation of ethnic tensions and enduring injustices
concerning land, corruption, marginalisation, regional inequality, and inequitable distri-
bution of resources.50 Violations of human rights have characterised the experiences of
Kenyans since colonial times and encompass political assassinations, extrajudicial kill-
ings by the police and torture as well as the displacement of people, which significantly
contributes to current conflicts over land.51
Since 2007, there have been a number of attempts to address these past violations,
including institutional reform, international and domestic prosecutions and the Truth,
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).52 The TJRC’s mandate did not only
cover the events of 2007–2008; it sought to investigate gross violations of human
rights (encompassing bodily integrity and socio-economic rights violations), economic
crimes, socio-economic marginalisation of communities and ethnic violence between
12 December 1963 (when Kenya gained independence) and 28 February 2008 (when a
power-sharing agreement was finalised).53 The commission found that land violations
had happened on a huge scale and were causally linked to ethnic and political violence,
that five regions had been systematically marginalised, and that unlawful killings, torture
and sexual violations had been widespread and often committed by state security agents.
It made far-reaching recommendations for lustrations, prosecutions and for a repara-
tions framework. The latter involved individual reparations (pensions, medical and psy-
chosocial support) and collective reparations (land restitution, socio-economic measures
and symbolic reparations), designed to benefit victims of bodily, socioeconomic and
structural violence.54
A lack of political commitment means that the recommendations of the report have
not been implemented. However, compensation was given to IDPs, with government
efforts particularly directed at the Rift Valley.55 Assistance programmes included Oper-
ation Rudi Nyumbani (Operation Return Home), aimed at encouraging individuals
living in IDP camps to return to their homes, with the government offering transport
costs, building and farming materials and some financial compensation. The government
also built houses and allocated plots in affected areas and sought to foster peace and
reconciliation.56 Despite the considerable efforts undertaken, thousands of IDPs
remained unable to return to their homes or settle in new areas, often due to having
lost their livelihoods or no longer being accepted in their communities of origin.57
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The timing and scope of the resettlement programme was criticised as premature, ethni-
cally divisive, and conducted without consultation or confidence-building measures.58
More recently, in 2019, the Auditor-General reported that the government irregularly
paid millions of shillings to people claiming to be IDPs.59
By contrast, survivors of sexual violence and their particular needs have been largely
ignored altogether. A constitutional petition by eight survivors and four NGOs – seeking
to hold the Government of Kenya accountable for its failure to prevent post-election
sexual violence, investigate perpetrators, and provide reparations – faced ‘excessive
delays in the justice process […] and frequent transfer of judges.’60 Constitutional Peti-
tion No. 122 of 2013 was finally heard in court in May 2020, with a landmark judgement
in December 2020 awarding compensation to four petitioners and finding government
responsible for a ‘failure to conduct independent and effective investigations and prose-
cutions of SGBV-related crimes during the post-election violence.’61
In 2015, President Uhuru Kenyatta announced a fund for restorative justice of 10
billion Kenyan Shillings that is not operationalised to date, though steps have been
taken to establish it. The scope of the Fund was not clearly set out, but appeared to be
considering a far narrower definition of victims, those of certain bodily integrity rights
violations. Lynch contends that the restorative justice fund was mooted as an alternative
to prosecutions, contributing to an overall trend of justice increasingly focusing on
reparations at the expense of accountability and retribution.62 That the President
announced this Fund as seemingly separate from the TJRC process, and without includ-
ing victims of socio-economic rights violations or addressing collective reparations,
might be understood as an attempt to marginalise the TJRC processes by rendering
reparations as magnanimity rather than a right of victims.63 President Kenyatta reiterated
commitment to the Fund in 2019, but stated that it would be applied ‘towards establish-
ing symbols of hope across the country through the construction of heritage sites and
community information centers’, as part of the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI),
which marks a significant departure from earlier promises of individual reparations.64
The Building Bridges to a United Kenya taskforce had been appointed after the symbolic
handshake between President Kenyatta and his opponent Raila Odinga that followed the
deeply contested 2017 elections, and has been branded as a national healing and unity
initiative.65 It involved two years of consultations with citizens, civil society organis-
ations, cultural leaders and the private sector, but has been criticised, in relation to the
concerns of this paper, for its neglect of the TJRC’s findings and recommendations on
corruption, land injustices, and human rights violations.66 At the same time, the Attor-
ney-General has blamed the National Assembly for failing to pass laws that would enable
the restorative justice funds to be released.67
Waiting for reparations
The women in this research had experienced displacement, dispossession, gender-based
violence and other severe ill-treatment during the 2007–2008 PEV. Some had also sur-
vived gross human rights violations in previous episodes of electoral violence. At the
time of research, campaigning for the 2017 elections was under way and was already
impacting people’s senses of safety. The eventual elections, in August and October
2017 involved serious human rights violations by Kenyan security forces and more
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than 100 people were unlawfully killed by police and pro-government gangs in Nairobi
and in western regions.68 This cyclical character of political violence in Kenya – political
violence has accompanied, to varying degrees, every election since the advent of multi-
party democracy in 1992 – and the structural violence that many continue to experience
constitute sources of uncertainty and ‘chronic crisis’69, and are important for under-
standing how the politics of waiting operate in relation to transitional justice.
While a small number of respondents were not aware that there had been a truth com-
mission in Kenya (in itself not surprising, since the final report was not disseminated as
adequately as the TJRC had stipulated and the hearings only received limited media cov-
erage), the majority knew about the TJRC and their entitlement to reparations. With
most interviewees not having received reparations or compensation, a decade after the
PEV, they felt neglected and forgotten about.
A smaller section of the participants identified as IDPs, one group of victims that did
receive some assistance, albeit unevenly, given that the government has been accused of
prioritising survivors from the Kikuyu community and focusing on supporting IDPs in
the Rift Valley over those displaced in other regions.70 Altogether, over 660,000 people
were internally displaced from ethnically heterogeneous parts of the country. Many of
them initially lived in camps until the government assisted in resettling them. As also
observed in previous literature showing the passivity and temporal suspension of
enforced waiting,71 participants often spoke about the negative effects of “doing
nothing” in the IDP camps: ‘when we were in the camp, you could not do anything
[…] we really suffered.’72 Senses of passivity in the accounts of participants in this
study were linked to their experiences of temporal uncertainty and of inequality, as I
show below. What is more, the notion of waiting as constituting dead or wasted time
can also act as a ‘powerful trope through which people can critique political, economic
and social systems of oppression.’73
The uncertainties of waiting
Participants’ experiences were characterised by fundamental uncertainty around if, when
and what kind of reparations would be received, and who would qualify. Many reflected
on their experiences of being put off, promises not being kept and goal posts forever
moving. Atieno, a 40-year-old community leader and single mother of 6 children who
identified as an integrated IDP, is worth citing at length:
On 25 October 2015, we sat with the devolution team, they came here, they were at a hotel,
they said that we would be compensated KES 20,000 each so that we can start small
businesses, so that we can be able to start life. And in 2016, [KES] 6 billion was set aside
for the integrated IDPs. But we have not seen it. Nothing. […] We are really suffering.
And we keep on having meetings every day. We want justice, we want compensation.
[…] Many come, nobody gives justice. When you want to talk to us, what can we say?
There is no justice. We have been asked too many times. We get asked to come to meetings,
we get given soda, and we leave with nothing. Our children remain with hunger, we don’t go
to work, and we go back with nothing.74
The function of (un)certainty has been discussed in relation to waiting in a number of
contexts, such as asylum processes or detention,75 but it has not been considered ade-
quately in relation to transitional justice.
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Access to information is central to how people cope with managing risk and uncer-
tainty.76 A great deal of misinformation by the state and its agencies clearly characterised
the transitional justice experiences of survivors like Atieno. Officials and politicians
occasionally visited conflict-affected areas like Kisumu or Mount Elgon and often
made new promises – but participants did not see any subsequent positive change.
Some spent considerable time seeking advice and information from government repre-
sentatives, NGOs and others that were perceived to be “in the know”. Participants in
Cheptais (a small town in Bungoma County in Western Kenya) and Eldoret (a city in
the Rift Valley) were told that reparations funds had now been withdrawn by a separate
department; they did not know where these funds were and when they would be paid out.
Yet other interviewees had met with representatives from the TJRC and reported being
promised that reparations would be given:
R: I spoke to them. And they told me that there is hope in life. And there is a time…
because the government goes very slowly…we are going to help you, so we still are
waiting.
I: When was this?
R: 2009.77
What is more, as Atieno’s narrative above shows, seeking to resolve temporal uncer-
tainty, for example by trying to find information or to mobilise for reparations, has
immediate economic implications: in informal economies, time spent in meetings is
time not spent earning money. Those living without resources and in precarious or inse-
cure situations are disproportionately more severely affected by temporal uncertainty78
and these effects may be exacerbated for women who are single heads of households
with responsibilities for dependents.
That the promise of justice for past violence was used by politicians during the 2017
election campaigns has further exacerbated survivors’ senses of uncertainty. Implemen-
tation of the TJRC report, particularly in relation to redressing land issues, was part of the
opposition’s presidency campaign, after some years of the report and its findings being
mostly ignored.79 The Restorative Justice Fund is another example of shifting ground
around redress for past violence. While it was initially discussed in terms of assistance
to victims for specific, but already more limited, violations than had been detailed in
the TJRC report, it subsequently appeared to have morphed into a potential resource
for generalised reconciliation efforts under the BBI.80 At the time of writing, there is
no clarity about the timing of implementation for the Fund. What is more, neither of
the two BBI reports makes any mention of the Fund. The second report refers to the
TJRC findings only in passing when discussing “ethnic antagonism” and “shared pros-
perity”, stating that:
Kenyans [consulted as part of the taskforce] recommended the implementation of past
Commission and Taskforce reports, including the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Com-
mission (TJRC) report, and the need to address historical injustices and land reforms
once and for all.81
Temporal specificity, such as a concrete deadline for reparations or an implementation
schedule for assistance programmes, represents a ‘point in the imagined […] which
engenders a certain degree of expectation of an outcome in temporal terms’.82 Conver-
sely, temporal uncertainty does not only encompass frequent delays and postponements,
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but also sudden disorienting changes like speeding up.83 This involved announcements
about changes in policies as well as political campaigning that promised reparations pay-
ments. There were reports, in early 2017, that integrated IDPs in Kisii and Nyamira
Counties were to be compensated, for example. However, in April 2017, Nakuru High
Court barred the Government from disbursing KES 6 billion set aside for resettlement
and compensation because those on the list were considered not to be genuine IDP
and the process lacked transparency.84 On one hand, participants welcomed that cam-
paigning had made the TJRC and its recommendations the subject of some public
debate again; on the other hand, they felt that possible compensation pay-outs were
used selectively to gain political mileage, disadvantaging areas that are already not con-
sidered to be supportive of government and therefore marginalised.
The absence of certainty can heighten waiters’ senses of passivity or paralysis, for
instance by undermining their ability to direct their use of time toward productive
income earning strategies, or by preventing them from being able to make longer-
term life plans.85 Such heightened passivity was reflected in participants’ accounts of
feeling hopeless and seeing no positive future. For example, John is a business owner
who was displaced from Kiambu Country to Kisumu:
We were told, wait for two weeks, the money is coming. Nothing. So it is something that has
really made us lose track. And another thing that is now killing us, so many people have died
because of trauma. So many. And our children, so many children have dropped out of
school. So you are carrying the trauma to the next generation. Because there is nothing
that can happen, there is nothing that is coming off. We are jobless, all that we have invested
went into nothing, we are hopeless. You can do nothing. So this thing has really made us to
be vulnerable.86
Enforced waiting becomes oppressive specifically when it undermines subsistence or
interrupts people’s ability to plan for better subsistence strategies.87 Most obviously, as
in John’s case, where businesses have been destroyed and livelihoods eroded through dis-
placement and violence, financial compensation and alternative employment opportu-
nities are needed. Also, a substantial number of participants still did not have
adequate shelter as a result of displacement or lived in accommodation they described
as temporary, conveying their senses of impermanence and instability.
There was a clear sense that the long passage of time without reparations was contri-
buting to survivors’ senses of marginalisation in relation to services, employment, and
health. As one widow from Eldoret put it:
waiting has really eroded our day to day living. Because there are some who do not have
anything, they are only waiting for that [KES] 200,000. And you are waiting for something
that you don’t know whether it will come. It becomes more difficult, and difficult and
difficult.88
The argument here is not that temporal uncertainty explains the complex challenges
faced by the survivors in this study. However, uncertainty about the “whether” and
“how much” of reparations or assistance is entangled with other existential insecurities
for people living in contexts of marginalisation, poverty and neglect and increases feel-
ings of powerlessness and lack of agency.
Temporal uncertainty in this context is not accidental; rather it is part of a transitional
justice politics in Kenya. In relation to immigration detention, it has been shown that the
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state governs through uncertainty, producing insecure subjects who do not belong and,
as a consequence, are deportable.89 Examining the experiences of poor people in the
welfare system, Auyero demonstrates that waiting manufactures compliance with state
policies and turns welfare clients from citizens with rights in the state into “patients”
of the state.90 Applying these insights to the experiences of participants, long-term
waiting for transitional justice might be understood as a way of disciplining survivors.
As discussed above, the shift to a shallow form of restorative justice at the expense of
accountability and retribution encourages people ‘to present themselves as victims in
exchange for assistance […] while a culture of impunity is upheld.’91 To add to this, pro-
longed waiting creates a ‘relatively stable condition that may lead to a reclassification of a
person’s status and […] transition into a social role’92, for example as an “internally dis-
placed person” or as a “victim”. Temporal uncertainty produces compliant and passive
subjects who see reparations not as their right but as a matter of goodwill and patronage,
patiently waiting for any kind of generalised support under the banner of reconciliation
rather than expecting justice for past violations.
The inequalities of waiting
If uncertainty is one of the factors that exacerbated the challenges of survivors in this
study, inequality is another. Sociologists of time argue that the distribution of waiting
time is connected with the distribution of power. Indeed, perceptions of marginalisation
were tied to inequalities in relation to reparations. This is perhaps best captured in the
words of one survivor who argued that ‘it is not about what happened then. It is
about how the society is treating us now.’93 Sentiments about uneven provision and
unequal waiting times were common across many interviews, such as the widespread
sense that IDPs in Central Kenya had quickly been given houses, land and financial
support to start life again:
Coming from my region [Kisumu County], you will not be compensated. If people don’t
come from the town of those in power, you will get nothing. So it is selective support; it
is selective compensation.94
This perception is reflected by civil society organisations that have accused the govern-
ment of prioritising resources and support for survivors from the Kikuyu community,95
while efforts in relation to IDPs were in fact predominantly concentrated on the Rift
Valley although displacement also occurred in other provinces.96
What is more, government assistance efforts after the 07/08 elections were focused
more on IDPs living in camps than so-called “returnees” and “integrated” IDPs.97 The
government considered about 50% of the displaced to have been “integrated” in commu-
nities. Somewhat contrary to this idea of being “integrated”, participants had been forced
to live with relatives or friends and frequently lacked adequate and decent housing; many
had lost their livelihoods; all were encountering a range of complex social, emotional and
economic challenges. The very terminology used by Kenyan authorities to describe
internally displaced people has spatial–temporal connotations: while those of certain
backgrounds are referred to as IDPs, others are labelled “returnees”, with the effect of
marginalising the impacts of their displacement and possibly seeking to absolve the gov-
ernment from its responsibilities towards them. The government also did not recognise
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displaced persons who do not own land as “genuine” IDPs, which, contrary to inter-
national standards, excludes traders, landless people and the homeless.98
Interviewees’ understandings of reparations weremoreover shaped by broader and long-
standing experiences of inequality, injustice andmarginalisation, frequently articulated by as
being “left behind” and “nobody coming for us”. TheTJRC itselfwasmandated to investigate
socio-economic rights violations since independence. It found that identified land injustices
rooted in colonial land polices andpost-independence governments’ exclusionary economic
policies and practices in the distribution of public jobs and services inflicted suffering on
huge sections of society, particularly in North Eastern, Coast, Nyanza, Western and North
Rift provinces.99 Narratives of ongoing or repeated marginalisation – both in relation to
the past and in terms of the reparations for that past –moreover reflect perceptions, particu-
larly among Kalenjin in the Rift Valley and also among Luo, that their culture led them
towards being “integrated” or “returned”, whereas ‘Kikuyu went and “cried” in the
open’.100 As one interviewee from Burnt Forest expressed it,
The government was a bit biased. They gave [compensation] to the Kikuyus, whereas also
there were Kalenjins who suffered. Because sometimes there are people who think that when
you scream loudly, you are the one who is so much offended, and there is someone who is
just weeping, even though they lost [as] many things than one who is screaming.101
Studies from other post-conflict contexts, for example in South Africa and Chile, show
that (the promise of) reparations can have unintended divisive effects at community
levels, such as increases in family or community conflicts and disruptions of community
networks, and can threaten or derail peace processes.102 In one focus group in a very het-
erogeneous small town in Nakuru County, some women felt that ‘compensation brings
problems’: ‘we are fooled by the politicians, they give us handouts and then we start
seeing each other as enemies.’103
Attention to the politics of waiting additionally highlights that delays shape survivors’
engagement with the state and with Kenyans from other ethnic or political communities
who are perceived to be favoured. While certain groups of victims will consider them-
selves as comparatively more “left behind” (irrespective of the fact that most victims of
the post-election violence did not receive reparations), delays in the implementation of
transitional justice are more likely to increase conflict and existing divisions, particularly
in ethnically and politically diverse communities. This is because the passage of time
allows senses of injustice to fester, while needs that drive people’s reparative demands
(and that are often the result of past violations) remain unaddressed. The sense that a
long wait can exacerbate conflict was reflected by a number of interviewees who talked
about their ‘patience running out’:
The cap of patience is turning over […] If other people in places have been compensated,
and people are going to the next election and so far nothing has ever happened so, you
know, that is a brick to the future.104
Another interviewee said that continued injustice in relation to reparations brings
bitterness:
Nothing was done about it [historical injustice] And that injustice brings a lot of bitterness
into our hearts. And you start to feel that I am being marginalised, there is no justice in this
country and then you start now hating everybody.105
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These comments can be understood as an expression of people’s socio-economic con-
ditions not having changed. But, given that transitional justice seeks to enforce a clear
break between past and present, waiting might foster a further sense of continuity that
threatens the transitional project – it is, as in the above extract, a brick to the idea of a
peaceful future. Put differently, if reparations, whether conceived as compensation or
as socioeconomic justice, are what helps victims move on from the past, to delay or
deny them is to keep the violent past and its injustices firmly in the present. To unevenly
delay the implementation of reparations programmes might then not only enhance div-
isions between survivors, but also undermine their willingness and ability to support the
aims of transitional justice.
Resistance to waiting
As argued above, to be waiting for reparations was frequently articulated with the
inability to leave the past behind; it was ‘to be paralysed’ (passim). For some, this associ-
ation of waiting with stagnation meant that, in order to move on from the past, they
needed to give up waiting. About a third of participants said that they no longer expected
reparations, and interviews and focus groups highlighted people’s very low levels of trust
in institutions of the state. As a mother of four in Kisumu put it: ‘I have been able to move
on. If there is a day that the government will want to compensate us, it is ok. But I have
personally given up on waiting. I have literally given up.’106 A woman from Cheptais
described waiting as ‘almost insulting’: ‘To me, waiting is just too much. As someone
who has lost property, someone who has lost land, somebody who lost life. Someone
who has lost almost everything. And now I have lost trust as well.’107
From the perspective of time and power, to refuse waiting for reparations is not only
indicative of a lack of trust in government or the end of hope, however; it can be read as a
rejection of the passivity and subordination of waiting:
The government was saying it will compensate us. But you know, now it is ten years down
the line. […] So if we wait to be compensated we will spoil our hearts. It is good for us to move
forward and we are praying for one thing. We want peace which will last so that we can do
our things. We can walk ourselves and we can have our peace with our neighbours, we can
interact with our neighbours, we can do many things even without compensation.108
In contrast to the accounts of the survivors summarised earlier, there was a sense in some
interviews that peace starts with themselves and that peace necessitates a rejection of the
temporality of waiting:
We have many conflicts. But we will not sit and wait. We are doing it at our own level. Even
in our village when we have baraza [a public meeting], when we have churches, we talk of
peace.109
“Not waiting” here involves senses of ownership and agency over what happens after
conflict and how sustainable peace can be achieved.
Women were involved in mostly unfunded and informal peacebuilding activities, such
as developing early warning systems, community mediation and training, and support
groups. Informal and unfunded peace work has recently received increasing attention,
with critical peacebuilding scholars questioning the elite-driven ‘liberal peace’ paradigm
that has excluded marginal and subaltern groups directly affected by violent conflict. This
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‘local turn in peacebuilding’ recognises that sustainable peacebuilding involves everyday
processes, and centrally focuses on the agency of local actors.110 Such peace work not
only constitutes a form of resistance against the dominant discourse and practices of
the ‘liberal peace’ as MacGinty and Richmond argue,111 but, in some of the communities
where this research was conducted, it occurs instead of national and international actors’
involvement, who were often perceived as absent.
What is more, local peacebuilding might well be particularly crucial in communities
where violence regularly flares up during electoral periods, and is often perpetrated by
the police.112 While “waiting” for reparations for the violations during the 2007–2008
crisis, people have been experiencing ongoing communal tensions, crises and some
periods of deep insecurity for the past decade, or, in some cases, since the beginning
of multi-party elections in Kenya. This character of violence shapes how the politics of
waiting operate and how waiting is endured, but also sometimes challenged, through
local peace work. To build peace locally is a necessary survival strategy in heterogonous
areas and it allows people to exercise peacebuilding agency in the context of government
institutions and political elites that are deemed to be untrustworthy, corrupt or absent.
Finally, a rejection of waiting is challenging the temporality of transitional justice
itself. This dominant temporality envisages that transitional justice processes lead to
peaceful futures, moving survivors to the present and leaving violence relegated to the
past.113 The experiences with transitional justice of survivors in this study did not
conform to this temporality, however. Reparations have not been implemented. What
is more, there is a continuity of violence for many. While waiting for transitional
justice, particularly in contexts of ongoing insecurity and extreme poverty such as
many participants in this study experienced, is often endured precisely because reparative
demands are driven by basic economic needs, 114 some resisted the power of the state and
other institutions to subordinate them through the politics of waiting by “moving on”
without the kind of narrow justice encompassed in Kenya’s reparations framework.
Conclusion
This study contributes to the scholarship on local experiences of transitional justice and
to the recent critical debates around its temporalities, by examining the ways in which
women survivors of human rights violations that qualified for reparations in Kenya
understood, negotiated and resisted waiting for transitional justice. Despite a relative
neglect of issues around time and power in transitional justice, this research demon-
strates that temporal issues shape societies emerging from conflict and the experiences
of people living in them. It finds that temporal uncertainty and temporal inequality
exacerbated the challenges faced by the participants and their understanding of and
engagement with transitional justice.
The function of uncertainty in relation to social control has been recognised in a
number of contexts, but it has not been considered in relation to transitional justice.
Here, temporal uncertainty resulted from a fundamental lack of clarity around the
timing, scope and schedule of reparations and from long delays as well as occasional
speeding up. It contributed to senses of passivity or paralysis and exacerbated survivors’
feelings of marginalisation. Adopting a politics of waiting lens, delays in implementation
can be understood as a government strategy that seeks to produce compliant victims who
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accept reparations as goodwill rather than transitional justice as a right. Recent years
under the Kenyatta administration have seen a shift from broader transitional justice
aims to a shallow form of restorative justice, resulting in a ‘world of victims without per-
petrators.’115 Inequality in relation to implementation and waiting times were shown to
add to people’s senses of being left behind by political elites and to their negative senti-
ments about those belonging to different political or ethnic group. To delay reparations
exacerbates senses of continuity with the past and its violence, which transitional justice
precisely intends to disrupt.
Temporal uncertainty and inequality clearly had disempowering effects on the partici-
pants in this study. Waiting for reparations is doubly harmful; it marginalises people who
have already been marginalised. Gendered experiences of conflict and “peace” and the
specific transitional justice needs of particular groups of people may further shape the
effects of a politics of waiting. This study mostly focused on the experiences of women
survivors, with some identifying as IDPs, and it is possible that victims experiencing
different kinds of violations, in different regions, negotiate the politics of waiting differ-
ently. Either way, processes of political subordination are only ever partial, as became
apparent in the narratives of people who did not wait. This constitutes a surprising
finding, as compliance with waiting can in part be explained by socio-economic margin-
ality. I have argued that people’s rejection of waiting can partly be read as exercising
agency in relation to local peacebuilding, but also as resistance against dominant tem-
poral frames that characterise transitional justice processes.
However, this kind of resistance against the politics of waiting should not be under-
stood as an alternative to implementing reparations and the wider TJRC recommen-
dations. This paper highlights that the timing of reparations is essential and that
transitional justice actors should seek to reduce uncertainty about reparations. What is
more, rather than time healing all wounds, senses of injustice and socio-economic mar-
ginalisation can increase if the needs that drive people’s reparative demands remain
unaddressed. The Kenyan transitional justice mechanism sought to address the socioe-
conomic issues that have driven political violence. It is unclear whether the shift
towards reconciliation, such as it is encapsulated in the Building Bridges Initiative, can
answer survivors’ concerns and senses of injustice.
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